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INTRODUCTION
To-day the world is divided into two armed camps.

The

United States and the Soviet Union are the two leaders
of these divergent groups .

Yet only fifteen years ago

these two nations were allied against the Axis powers .
An obvious question is what caused this wartime alliance

to degenerate into the present conf'lict.
led to this occurance are numerous.

The factors which

Therefore, it would

be impossible to take any individual, nation, or event
and say the responsibility is theirs.

However, when

charges and counter-charges are being made, the name
"Yalta" appears freq_uently.

Some extremests will tell

you that the majority of to-days problems, concerning the
Soviet Union, had their birth at this meeting of Roosevelt,
Stalin, and Churchill at Yalta in February 1945.

It is

desirable to look closer at this event, and to find out
just what did occur.

The purpose of this paper will be

to discuss some of the major decisions which were reached
at Yalta, and to see what factors led to these decisions.
Also an appraisal will be made of the diplomacy of President Roosevelt during this conference.

This will be
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accomplished by discussing the major criticisms and
justifications of the decisions he made , and the method
by which the decisions were reached.
The Crimean Conference held at Yalta in the Soviet
Union will go down in history as one of the most important
events of all time.

Here in eight days President Frank-

lin Roosevelt of the United States, Prime Minister Winston
Churchill of Great Britain, and Premier Josef Stalin of
the Soviet Union made many important decisions that were
to influence the happenings in the post war world.

Not

only is the Crimean Conference import ant because of the
decisions themselves, but the controversy over the
decisions and the way that they were reached is still
going on to-day.

In America the feelings about the

Crimean Co:ni'erence run to great extremes.

On one hand

the agreements are branded as a complete betrayal of
democratic principles, and of American interests and
are the source of our post war difficulties with the
Soviet Union.

While on the other hand they are defended

as great diplomatic victories for the Western Allies on
the grounds that the terms which Stalin accepted were
so unfavorable to Russia that he couldn't fulfill his
aggressive designs without violating his solemn pledge.l
1 Chester Wilmot, "Was Yalta a Calamity?n, New York
Times Magazine, XXXVII (August 3, 1952), 46-48.

AN EVALUATION OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AT YALTA
BACKGROUND

A survey of some background information is needed before we can discuss the conference itself.

The first

question that arises i s why was it necessary that a conference be held.

The Big Three had not held a meeting

since December, 1943, at Tehran.

There were some major

problems which had arisen, and there was a general feeling
that these problems could best be handled at the summit
level.

The last great German offensive had been stopped

on the Western Front, and the Russians were in control of
Eastern Euro pe.

There was a need to co-ordinate the final

offensives against Germany.

The questi on of what to do

with Germany had to be settled, and new governments had
to be established in the newly liberated areas of Central
Europe.

In the Far East the defeat of Japan seemed a

long way off; however, it was important that the United
States find out what part the Soviet Union was to play
in this subsequent defeat.

A second question is why was Yalta, a city in the
Soviet Union, chosen as the site for the conference.
It would appear that such a conference should be held
3
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at a neutral loc a tion.
of

hag~lin g ,

agreed upon.

The choice involved quite a bit

and six months passed before a site could be
President Roosevelt suggested such places

as Scotland, Cyprus, and Athens; however, Stalin reso l utely refused to leave the Soviet Union.

The main

reason which h.e gave was that his doctors had advised
that his health was not good enough to endure a long trip.2
To ful l y understand an event it is necessary to look
at the conditon of the world at the time the event
occurred.

These world conditions will be used at various

times throughout this paper to help explain why certain
actions were taken.

On the We stern European Front the

Anglo-American Forces, h aving lately recovered the territory
lost in the

Bat ~ le

of the Bul ge, were just entering German

territory.

In Italy the Appenine Mountains made the

progres s very slow, and the Po River was yet to be reached.
In the Far East the American Navy had defeated the last
important Japanese Naval
Gulf.

Grou~

in the battle of Leyte

However, Luzon had not been ful l y captured, and

the very bloody battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa were
still in the future.

Nobody really knew how long it

would take to full y conquer the Japanese.

Meanwhile the

Russians had driven the Germans across Eastern Europe
2John L. Snell, The Meaning of Yalta (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1956), p. 26-34.
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and had liberated Rumania, Bulgaria, and parts of Poland
and Hungary. 3
EVALUATION OF METHOD
There are some general criticisms of the Yalta Conference that must be dealt with before we can evaluate
the individual decisions.

These comments deal mostly

with President Roosevelt himself and some of the procedures he used in conducting United States af fa irs at
the conference.

There is fe eling that Mr. Roosevelt's

method of work wasn't systematic.

He did not rely

enough on his subordinates for the information needed to
make wise decisions.

As a result he made mistakes which

he would not have made had he used all the sources of information

availf~le

to him.

Also the subordinates were not

kept up to date on just what type of action he was persuing.4
Also along this same train of thought were objections
to the amount of secrecy which was involved in some of
the transactions between Stalin and Roosevelt.

These

secret deals, plus the fact that no Congressional representatives were present, made it ap pear that President Roosevelt
was showing a disregard for Constitutional principles.
3Allan Nevins, The New Deal in World Affairs (New Haven:
Yale University Press , 1951), p . 297.
4Rudolph A. Winnacker, "Yalta-Another Munich?n, The
Virginia Quarterl y Review, XXIV, (October 1948), 522-'37"°

6

He usurped the powers which should have belonged to
Congress as personal representatives of the free people
of America.

These critics feel that President Roosevelt

exceeded the power which had been vested in him as President of the United States.5
Supporters of Mr. Roosevelt point out that the circumstances dictated that he assume a great deal of personal power at the eonferenee.

The question of whether

his methods violated the Constitution is not one that can
be solved in a concrete manner but can only be discussed
in the light of how the Constitution should be interpreted.

President Roosevelt was forced to make many

quick decisions.

These decisions had to be of a personal

nature, since it would have been impossible for Mr. Roosevelt to have accomplished anything if he had checked with
Congress on e ach issue before he made a decision.

This

type of action would have rendered him powerless and
would have made such a summit meeting an impossibility.6
The President's use of secrecy can be justified by the
nature of the decisions that were to be made, especially
those involving the entrance of Russia into the Asiatic
War.

A second general area of criticism involves relations
between the United States and Great Britain prior to
5navid Lawrence, "The Sin of Yalta" U.S. News and World
Report, XXXVIII, {April 1, 1955), 132.
6Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S Furniss, Jr, American
Foreign Policy (New York: Rinehart and Go., Inc, T956),
p. 457-520.
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and dur i ng the conference.

At the time the conference

was held Anglo-American rel a tions were at a low ebb.

We

had openly criticized British action in attempting a sphere
of influence in the Balkans.
the idea that we therefore
area.

This could have given Rus s ia

sup ~ orted

their claims in that

Secondly President Roosevelt didn't hold any major

strategy sessions with Churchill prior to the Yalta
Conference.

This seemed an error since our views on most

of the vital is sues were really v ery similar to those of
the British.

Our position would h ave been much stronger,

and we could have presented a united front if we had taken
the time to meet to-gether to work things out.

Third even

after the conference had started Pre sident Roosevelt
assumed the role of the mediator and s pent much of his time
settling dis puted between Rus s ia and Great Britain when he
should have been so l idly behind the British. 7
The problem for Roosevelt supporters is to explain
the logic behind President Roosevelt's treatment of Great
Britain.

Here is the apparent strategy behind the action.

President Roosevelt was convinced that Russia was going
to play a major role in the post-war world.

Any organ-

iz at ion to maintain world peace, such as the United Nations,
must contain a co-operative Soviet Union if it was to have
any chance of working.

Therefore, President Roosevelt

7wilmot, New York Times Magazine, XYJ:VIII, 46.
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did everything in his power to help Russia feel that we
were sincerely interested in co-operating with them.
Knowing the suspicious nature of the Russians, he felt
that any extensive meeting towork out joint policy with
the Br·i tish would be looked upon by the Soviet Union as a
conspiracy.

He did not want Stalin to feel he was faced

with an Anglo-American Coalition.
Secondly, Roosevlet felt

~hat

only in his position

as mediator could he bring the divergent views of Churchill
and Stalin closer together.

Always siding with the British

would have cuaused an immediate schism, and none of the
objectives of the peace could possibly be attained.
EVALUATION OF TEE MAJOR DECISIONS
Next we will look at some of the particular decisions
which were reached at the conference.

The four main areas

to be surveyed are the Polish question, Germany, United
Nations Organization, and the entry of Russia into the
Asiatic War.
Question.

The first item to be covered is the Polish

At the time the conference was held the Russians had

liberated most of Poland.

They had already set up a

pro-communist government known as the Lublin Provisional
Government.

Therefore, the two basic questions involved

the new boundaries of Poland, and the type of government
it should have. 8

The boundary question was settled in the

8Ernest K. Lindley, "If There Had Been No Yalta",
Newsweek, XLV, (March 25,1955), 31.

9

following manner.

It was agreed that the Curzon Line,

with minor digressions of five to eight kilometers in
favor of Poland, should serve as the eastern boundary.
This meant that a 69,000 square mile area of pre-war
Poland would become Soviet territory.

To compensate for

this loss Poland was promised part of East Prussia and
substantial German territory lying east of a general line
drawn from Stettin southward to the western border of the
Silesia :province.

The government problem was handled by

giving recognition to the Moscow sponsored Lublin Provisional
Government, but it was agreed that the provisional government should be reorganized on a broader democratic basis.
This would be accomplished by including democratic leaders
from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. 9
Major criticism of the Polish decisions fall into
four main categories.

The first is that the action of

Churchill and Roosevelt in agreeing to the boundary changes
was a direct violation of the Atlantic Charter.

In the

Atlantic Charter a pledge had been made that no new boundaries would be imposed without the will of the people involved.

Therefore, it was wrong for President Roosevelt to

agree to the dividing up of a country with no apparent
concern for the peo ple involved.10
9Encyclo2edia Americana, (New York: Americana Corp.,

1959), :p. 559z."

.

m~
· -

lOJulius w. Pratt, A History of United States Forei~n
Policy (Englewood Clifts, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1955,
p. 688-9.
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Secondly, it was felt that a much firmer stand should
have been taken concerning the proposed government for
Poland.

At first Roosevelt refused to completely re-

cognize the Russian puppet Lublin Government and demanded
a fresh government with all parties having an equal
opportunity through free elections.

However, he compromised

his stand until he accepted the Lublin group as the framework of the new government.

Roosevelt's willingness to

make concessions in the hope of obtaining Russian cooperation can be seen in the following statement.

"I am

determined that there shall be no break between ourselves
and the Soviet Union regarding Poland.rr

In fact Roosevelt

was so anxious that he even gave way when Stalin objected
to a British proposal that the Polish elections should
be supervised by the British, Americ an, and Soviet
Ambassadors in Warsaw.11
The f ate of Poland provided a test case for the whole
Yalta enterprise.

Here, if anywhere, the West could have

made a do-or-die stand on the simple issue of fair play
for a gallant ally.

But Roosevelt merely pleaded for a

little sugar coating on the bitter Polish pill, and the
best argument he could muster was the need to satisfy the
Polish-American vote to keephis party in power.12
llwilmot, The New York Times Magzine, XXXVII, 46-7.
12Eugene Lyons, rtThe Yalta Calmity", American Mercury,

LXXXI, (July 1955) 96-8.
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The following points can be presented as justification
of President Roosevelt's Polish decisions.

True, the

departures from the Atlantic Charter and some minor
concessions can not be defended if placed by themselves.
However, by placing them in their proper relation to overall
world conditions, they become understandable.

Russia's

tremendous military success on the Eastern Front and the
fact she was presently occupying most of pre-war Polish
territory put the United States in a very poor bargaining
position.

Therefore, it was not a question of what we

would permit Russia to do but one of what we could persuade
them not to do.

The selection of the Curzon Line had

sound ethnological arguments.

This line had been drawn

by an Englishman in 1919, and Churchill already had supported the Curzon Line in the House of Commons before
the Yalta Conference.

Although Stalin was very set on this

border, he did make deviations of five to eight kilometers
to Poland.

In regards to government, the Russians had

set up the Lublin Government and insisted that it only needed
to be enlarged.

However, Roosevelt finally got Stalin to

agree to the reorganization mentioned above.

He also

obtained from Stalin a promise that free elections would
be held at the earliest possible date.

The trouble was not

in the agreements reached but in the fact that the Russians
didn't keep their word.

It must be remembered that in any

12

conference compromises must be made.

So Roosevelt sup-

porters feel, considering the bad military position, the
fact we got the Russians to make any concessions was quite
an accomplishment.13
The second main area of survey will be Germany.
future status of Germany was left undecided.

The

After sur-

render it was to be divided into four zones for occupational
purposes.

The Big Three plus France would make up the

occupying powers.

It was decided that reparations were to

be paid to the nations which had borne the main brunt of
German agression.
reparations.

There were to be three main types of

First was the removal over a two year period

of capital goods for the chief purpose of destroying the
war po tential of Germany.

Second, there would be an annual

delivery of goods from current production.

Third, German

labor could be used by the country receiving reparations.14
The majority of the attack on the decisions concerning
Germany are based on the payment of reparations.

It was

:pointed out that the excessive reparations which had been
imposed on Germany following World War I were a basis for
the financial problems which beset the post-war German
government.

These same financial problems caused collapse

and gave rise to the dictatorial power of Hitler.

The same

13Edwin R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1949), p. 300-3.
14Pratt, 686-7.
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mistake was being made again.

However, the most shocking

part of the reparation agreement was the use of German
labor as a part of the payment.

Here we were agreeing

to the same things which we had so violently criticized
the Germans for doing.

It appeared very much against

the fundmental beliefs of Ame r ica to allow men to be
sold into slavery.
The main victory for Roosevelt in this area was the
securing of Russian approval to give France an occupation
zone and a seat on the control council.

This gave France

additional prestige, which was badly needed.

President

Roosevelt also fought very hard on the mat t er of reparations
and was able to keep Stalin from putting the figure of
twenty bill ion in the agreement.15
The use of German labor as reparation is difficult
to justify.

However, it is to be remembered that we were

waging a bloody war with the Germans, and no one was
disposed to be very tender toward Germany, especially in
light of some of the sens a tional examples of German barbarianism that were being discovered in some of their
prison camps.

In regard to the treatment of the Germans

being a violation of the Atlantic Charter, Winston Churchill
said, "Unconditional Surrender excluded the enemy from any
15stettinius, 263-6.
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of the benefits of the Atlantic Charter.
A third major area of discussion at the Crimean Con-

ference concerned the formation of the United Nations
Organization.

At Yalta two major problems which were hin-

dering the formation of the United Nations were discussed.
The first dealt with how heavily were the major powers to
be represented in the General Assembly.

Stalin had de-

manded sixteen seats for the Soviet Union.
of the republics.
have one vote.
three votes.

One for each

Roosevelt felt all countries should

A compromise was worked out giving Russia
The second question was how thoroughly were

the great powers to dominate the world organization?

To

safeguard the right of the major powers, the Big Five
were given veto power in the Security Council.

In other

words , all that would be needed to block U.N. action would
be a negative vote by one of the Big Five.

An amazing

fact, in light of subsequent happenings, is that both
the United States and Russia wanted some type of a veto
power.

The question was whether this veto should apply

to all matters or in the more serious cases.

Russia wanted

unlimited veto power while the United States felt it should
be restricted.

The United States was largely successful

because the veto power was limited to more important matters
such as admission and expulsion of members and the use of
force against an agressor nation.16
16pratt, 689.
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The right of veto power in the Security Council has
proven to be the biggest factor in limiting the action of
the United Nations.

Here President Roosevelt not only

showed disdain for the rights of the small nations of
the world but also overlooked two important danger signals.
Stalin gave indication of his future designs in his demand
for more seats and his insistance on being able to block
any action taken against Russia.

The aim of the United

Nations was world peace, and a veto power made it impossible
to take steps against the Big Five, the only nations capable
of waging war.17
How then will it be possible to justify the destruction
of the Organization President Roosev elt so greatly desired?
Supporters can point to the fact that lifiir. Roosevelt forced
Stalin to compromise in both major areas.

Although they

are not apparent to-day, there are some basic reasons why
Roosevelt desired the veto :power.

First, a survey of history

shows that the United States did not join the League of
Nations because of the fear that we would be drawn into
all manner of foreign disputes without our wishing it.
The veto power would give Congress and the people of the
United States the assurance that we would not be the helpless pawns of a world organization over which we had no
control.

Haa_ President Roosevelt taken a stand against

the veto, it is a foregone conclusion that Russia would
17"The Yalta Story", Time, LXV (March 28, 1955), 27-32 .
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have taken no part in any United Na t ion's activities.
Therefore, since a major goal of Roosevelt was to get
Russia in the United Nations, he would have been forced
to go along with the veto or see his goal vanish.

In

accepting the veto Roosevelt was going along with the
wishes of the majority of A.mericans.18
A fourth topic for examination is the entrance of the
Russi ans into the Asiatic War and the concessions which
were given to the Russians for their participation.

How-

ever, before discussing the advisability of the concessions,
it is important to discover if Russian help was reall y
needed to defe at the Japanese.
Opponents of Roo s evelt's policies would have you believe that by February, 1945, we were well on our way to
victory in the Pacific.

There is no good reason why Pres-

ident Roosevelt didn't know this.

Much of this comment

i s base d on the fact that the United States now had a very
powerful weapon known as the atomic bomb.

On December . 30,

1944, Major General Leslie Groves, Chief of the Manhattan
District Project, sent a to p secret report to the Chief
of Staff, Genera l Marshall.
ident who approved it.
Bombs".

A copy also went to the Pres-

It was labeled. nAtomic Fis s ion

It read as follows:

rrrt is now reasonable certain that our operations plans should be b a sed on the gun type bomb
18stettinius, 295-9.
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which it is estimated will produce the equivilent
of a ten-thousand ton TNT explosion. The first
bomb, without previous full scale tests which
we do not believe wil l be necessary, should
be ready about 1 August 1945.nl9
It appears that top United States leaders knew that we
should soon have in our possession a bomb capable of destroying a whole city.
Not only were we soon to have a bomb, but the air
and sea power of Japan had been greatly reduced.

Therefore,

it was already a known fact that we were going to win the
war in the Pacific, it was just a matter of time.
Getting the Russians into the Asiatic was was one of
the main goals th .: !.t Roosevelt had at the Yalta Conference.
The Pr·esident was the victim of a report which had been
submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This report had

stated that the end of the Japanese surrender would be
the lat ter part of 1946.

To achieve this surrender, it

would be necessary to invade the highly fortified home
islands of Japan.

These operations could cause the United

States one million casualties.

Also the Japanese had a

strong force on the Asiatic mainland.

It had been hoped

tha t the Chinese would be strong enough to keep them engaged, but the Chinese were sapped by long warfare.
Therefore, a Russian invasion of Manchuria was needed.
A long drawn out war would have a demoralizing effect on
the already war-weary American soldie rs ; therefore
19 11 Things Yalta Papers Reveal" , U.S. News and World
Report, XXXVIII, ( March 25, 1955), 42-5.
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Roosevelt felt justified in calling for Russian aid in an
efff ort to shorten the war .

The real value of the atomic

bomb was questionable as there had been no actual tests
to determine what effect it would have on the enemy.20
There were people who felt we needed Rus s ian help
in the Pacific but objected to the concessions
obtain this aid .

g~ ven

to

In agreeing to enter the Asiatic War

three months after the war in Eurpoe was terminated the

(l) The Kurile

Russians received the following things:

Islands and southern Sakhalin were ceded to the Soviet
Union; (2) The status quo in Outer Mongolia was preserved;
(3 .) The .commercial port of Darien was internationalized,

with the understanding that the preeminant interests of
the Soviet Union were safeguarded, and lease of Port Arthur
as a naval base of the Soviet Unj_on wa s restored;

(4)

The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and South Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet for Darien was jointly
operated by the Chinese and Russians, it being understood
that the preeminant interests of the Soviet Union were
safeguarded, and that China was to retain full sovereignty
in Ma...nchuria . 21
Critics of these concessions point out that even if
we felt we needed Russian help, we didn't need to give them
L • - ·
·----· · -

20stettinius, 301-7.
21s ne i 1, 150 •
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anything.

How else could Russia extend its sphere of in-

fluence in the Pacific without joining in on the defeat of
Japan?

Therefore , why give away anything that was destined

to be free.

Mr . Anthony Eden, Foreign Minister of Great

Britain had this to say about Russian participation in the
Pacific War .

11

If Russia decided to enter the war it was

because they considered it not in their best interests
that the Japanese War should be successfully finished by
the United States and Britain alone. 11 22
Charges are also made that we sold out our ally China
by making these concessions without prior consultation
with Chiang Kai-Shek.

Obviously by giving the Russians

the preeminant interest in the Manchurian Railroad and
the cities of Port Arthur and Darien, it would be next
to impossible for China to keep their promised sovereignty
in Manchuria.

Russia not China would have the main control.

This give away of Chinese rights was a direct violation of
our century long stand for the territorial integrity of
the Chinese Nation.23
Why then was Roosevelt willing to make these concessions?
First it must be remembered that the securing of Russian aid
in the Pacific was one of the major objectives of Roosevelt.

He considered that the gain from the military

intervention was much greater than the concessions he had
22Time
_ , LXV, 42-5 .
23John C. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947) p. 68.
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made.

Also the conces s ions are justified by the following

statement:

nwhat was given to Russia that Russia eould

not have very easily taken themselves.n
lowing case.

Take the :fol-

The Russians cou1d very easily watched

while the United States and Japan continued to wage war;
and when both were engaged in a bitter struggle over the
home islands, then Russia could occupy Manchuria, Northern
China, Korea, and anything else they wanted .

These agree-

ments at Yalta set a limit on what they could legally
occupy and contro1.24

24Lindley, Newsweek, XLV, 31.

CONCLUSION
I would like to look at Yalta as one grand effort
to produce a world in which all nations could live in
peace.

President Roosevelt knew that this peace could

only be attained through the work of the United Nations.
The only way the United Nations could function succes s fully was to have the Soviet Union as a full-fledged
co-o pe rating member.

To accomplish this, President

Roosevelt knew he had to alter the suspicious nature of
the Russians .

They had to be convinced that the United

States and Great Britain were interested in dealing with
them in an atmosphere of mutual trust. .

It was this

knowledge and the great fe ar of what would happ en if the
Soviet Union and the United States became enemies that
lead him to make the compromises which today look appeasing .
Despite the lofty aspirations of Roosevelt it would
appear that he was guilty of an oversight.

He did not take

into con sideration the implic a tions of Communism.
President Roosevelt thought he was dealing with Stalin the
ruler of our al ly the Soviet Union, when in reality he
was dealing with Stalinthe leader of a Communist idealogy
which has as its g oal the destruction of all capitalist
nations.
~l

22

It has now been fifteen ye a rs since Yalta.

Agree-

ments made have been broken.

The vision of a world living

in peace has been shattered.

However, I do not fell the

effort was made in vain.

Only the future history of the

world can give us the full answer.
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